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SECTION 666: THE BEAST IN THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL ARSENAL
An essential element of modem American society is the Federal Govern-
ment's role in developing, maintaining, and financing a variety of programs
designed to assist its citizens and protect the nation. Such federal programs
include various types of social insurance,' community funds for develop-
ment,2 and funds to private contractors working on federal projects.3 Be-
cause the government provides large quantities of funds, benefits, grants, and
contracts to private organizations and state and local governments, the Fed-
eral Government has an interest in protecting those funds from use in crimi-
nal activity.4
Prior to 1984, federal criminal statutes provided for the punishment of
individuals who committed crimes affecting federal resources. However,
those statutes were inadequate to cover the panoply of crimes involving enti-
ties independent of the Federal Government.5 Two significant areas of fed-
eral concern were the theft of government property and the bribery of
government officials. While punishment for these offenses was provided for
by traditional federal criminal statutes, these provisions were ill-equipped to
deal with the growing power and influence of the Federal Government.
Under the federal theft and bribery statutes in force prior to 1984, the
United States could successfuly prosecute theft and bribery involving federal
funds only if the funds were under federal control6 or the individuals in-
volved were federal employees.7 As a result of these constraints, federal ju-
1. See generally Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1982); Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1982 & Supp. 1987); Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395
(1982); National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1769 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
2. See generally Comprehensive Employment and Training Program Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 801 (1982); Community Development and Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5302-5320 (1982);
Community Services Block Grant Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9901-9912 (1982).
3. See generally Federal Procurement Office Policy Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-260 (1982).
4. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3510 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225]. The enactment of a new criminal
offense was intended "to augment the-ability of the United States to vindicate significant acts of
theft, fraud, and bribery" in entities that receive federal funds. Id.
5. Id.
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
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risdiction over government-distributed monies was limited, producing a gap
in the existing federal criminal law.'
Dissatisfied with this subversion of federal interests, Congress reformed
the federal criminal law in 1984, 9 and in doing so, enacted section 666. Sec-
tion 666 of title 1810 avoids the problems of the existing federal bribery and
theft statutes by eliminating the government's burden of establishing a link
between the stolen property or the bribed official and the Federal Govern-
ment. " The passage of section 666 enhances the Federal Government's abil-
ity to monitor federal program funds by creating potential federal
jurisdiction over the criminal conduct of employees or agents employed by
any entity receiving federal benefits.12 However, in eliminating the problems
caused by the narrow boundaries of the earlier statutes, Congress enacted a
general federal criminal statute of potentially limitless scope and effect.
This Note considers Congress' attempt to protect from criminal use fed-
eral monies received by private organizations and state, local, and Indian
tribal governments pursuant to federal aid programs. First, this Note fo-
cuses on Congress' passage of legislation creating a federal cause of action
against agents or employees of groups receiving federal funds who commit
substantial acts of theft or bribery, regardless of whether the act is related to,
traced to, or connected to such federal funds. It then discusses sections 201
and 641 of title 18, the federal bribery and theft statutes in effect prior to
1984, emphasizing those statutes' inadequacies. Next, this Note analyzes
section 666 of title 18, which Congress enacted in response to its dissatisfac-
tion with the limited scope, force, and effect of sections 201 and 641. This
analysis contrasts the literal language of section 666 with the earlier theft
and bribery statutes, reviews a range of judicial decisions interpreting the
scope of section 666, and analyzes the statute's potential impact on federal
theft and bribery cases decided prior to the enactment of section 666. Fi-
nally, this Note demonstrates that while section 666 achieves Congress' goal
8. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3510.
9. K. FEINBERG & S. SCHREIBER, COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984
(1985) (the enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act was a significant reform in
federal criminal law); see generally S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 726, 803 (1981) (the
legislation was enacted to correct recurring problems in the areas of theft and bribery).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1988).
11. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3510. Earlier federal statutes provided punishment only for bribery of "public offi-
cials" and theft of "property of the United States." Id.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 666. Examination of the language of section 666 reveals that the Federal
Government can obtain jurisdiction over the employees or agents of certain organizations sim-
ply because that organization receives federal funds. For a complete discussion of section 666,
see infra notes 95-151 and accompanying text.
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of closing a gap in federal criminal law, the statute's broad language permits
its applicability to areas and individuals well beyond both congressional in-
tent and federal concern.
I. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FEDERAL THEFT
AND BRIBERY STATUTES
Prior to the enactment of section 666 of title 18, the primary weapons the
Federal Government used to punish the theft of federal property and the
bribery of public officials were section 20113 and section 641.14 Although
these two statutes are still in effect, interpretation of the provisions of these
statutes by federal courts limited their scope and restricted their
effectiveness.' 5
13. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988). The statute, entitled Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses,
provides in pertinent part:
(b) Whoever-
(1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value to
any public official or person who has been selected to be a public official, or offers or
promises any public official or any person ... selected to be a public official to give
anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent-
(A) to influence any official act; or
(B) to influence such public official ... to commit or aid in committing, or col-
lude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the commission of any fraud
...; or
(C) to induce such public official ... to do or omit to do any act in violation of
the lawful duty
shall be fined not more than three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of
value, or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both ....
Id.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988). The statute, entitled Public Money, Property or Records,
states, in pertinent part, that:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of
another, or without authority, sells, conveys, or disposes of any record, voucher,
money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof,
or any property made or being made under contract for the United States or any
department or agency thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert to his use or
gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted-
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both; but if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100, he shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 663 (2d Cir. 1975) (Section 201 of
Title 18 is applicable only if the defendant bribed a "public official," as defined by the statute.
United States v. Tana, 618 F. Supp. 1393, 1395 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (A defendant can be con-
victed under section 641 of title 18 only if the property stolen is "property of the United
States.").
1990]
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A. The Federal Theft Statute: 18 U.S.C. § 641
Section 641 of title 1816 provides that an individual who commits theft or
fraud, embezzles or converts virtually any type of property or "thing of
value" which either belongs to the United States17 or involves a contract to
which the United States is a party, violates federal law."S Furthermore, the
statute states that it is a federal crime to receive such illegally acquired prop-
erty.19 Despite the statute's apparently broad language, judicial interpreta-
tion severely restricted its scope. Specifically, congressional examination of
the effectiveness of section 641, as applied to organizations receiving federal
monies, revealed several serious problems.2" First, Congress recognized that
it was often impossible for the United States Attorney to prove that the sto-
len property was of federal character.21 Second, Congress noted that state
and local law enforcement agencies were reluctant to expend the time and
money needed to prosecute such thefts, because the primary injured party
was the Federal Government.22 Third, Congress acknowledged that judicial
decisions restricting the application of section 641 to only those instances in
which the stolen property was property of the United States sharply cur-
tailed the statute's effectiveness.23
The supervision and control the Federal Government exerts over the
property is a key factor in the court's determination of whether misappropri-
ated property is property of the United States, and thus within the confines
of section 641.24 In United States v. Smith, 25 the government charged Smith
and others with defrauding the United States by stealing College Work-
16. 18 U.S.C. § 641.
17. Id. The language "property of the United States" is the most important element of
section 641 and receives particular scrutiny from the courts. See generally Tigar, The Right of
Property and the Law of Theft, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1461-62 (1984)(defining section 641 and
providing a general disussion of the significant language).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 641.
19. Id.
20. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 3510.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The wording of section 641 restricts its use to those thefts involving property of
the Federal Government. See United States v. Fleetwood, 489 F. Supp. 129, 132 (D. Oregon
1980); see also Tigar, supra note 17, at 1463-64 (under section 641, the government claims that
it controls the res, which is capable of being stolen).
24. See United States v. Smith, 596 F.2d 662, 664 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he key factor is the
supervision and control contemplated and manifested on the part of the government.") (empha-
sis added); see also United States v. Tana, 618 F. Supp. 1393, 1396 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussing
the government's lack of sufficient control); Fleetwood, 489 F. Supp. at 132 (government con-
trol is an essential element of the crime).
25. 596 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1979).
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study funds,26 provided by the Higher Education Act of 1965.27 The de-
fendants challenged their convictions, asserting that the stolen money was
outside the scope of section 641 because it was not "money of the United
States."2 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed the degree of supervision and control necessary to qualify the misap-
propriated funds for protection under section 641.29
While acknowledging that a grant paid to a recipient or otherwise dis-
bursed is no longer federal,3 ° the Fifth Circuit emphasized that funds "in
transit" from the government to the beneficiary are still federal in nature.3'
The court reasoned that such funds, although no longer in exclusive federal
possession, were "still subject to substantial federal controls, ' 32 making their
theft an offense punishable under section 641.13 According to the Smith ra-
tionale, the Federal Government's exercise of supervision and control over
the property in question is the fundamental factor in determining the appli-
cability of section 641." 4
While the Smith court's analysis of the nature of federal funds resulted in
a decision favorable to the government, two federal district courts consid-
ered cases with facts similar to Smith, and reached the opposite result. In
United States v. Fleetwood,35 the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon overturned the section 641 conviction of a defendant who embez-
zled United States Savings Bonds and Freedom Share Notes.3 6 In addition
to its consideration of the degree of federal control over the allegedly stolen
property, 37 the court added a twist to the analysis by holding that section
26. Id. at 663.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2751 (1982).
28. Smith, 596 F.2d at 663.
29. Id. at 664.
30. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Owen, 536 F.2d 340, 342, 344 (10th Cir. 1976) (when
federal money is paid to a recipient or is commingled with nonfederal funds it loses its federal
identity); United States v. Farrell, 418 F. Supp. 308, 311 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (section 641 of title
18 requires the Federal Government to have title to or possession of the stolen property).
31. Smith, 596 F.2d at 664.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 664; see also United States v. Fleetwood, 489 F. Supp. 129, 132 (D. Oregon
1980) (absence of federal possession does not negate federal control) disapproved in United
States v. Wyatt, 737 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the Fleetwood court's holding on the
issue of the government's actual loss, but approving its analysis of supervision and control).
34. Smith, 596 F.2d at 664 (citing United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 470-71 (5th Cir.)
(the court held that the primary consideration is the supervision and control exercised by the
government), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978)).
35. 489 F. Supp. 129 (D. Oregon 1980).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 132.
1990]
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641 requires the Federal Government to suffer an actual property loss. 3 8 In
Fleetwood, the government neither controlled nor possessed title to the sto-
len bonds.39 In the absence of evidence indicating federal ownership and
actual financial loss, the court held that the defendant stole the bonds from a
private citizen.' Thus, the court's inability to discern a link between the
stolen property and the Federal Government permitted the defendant to es-
cape the statute's sanctions.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
reached a result similar to Fleetwood in United States v. Tana.4 1 In Tana,
the defendants stole and converted property which was pledged to the Fed-
eral Government as security on federal loans to begin a new business opera-
tion.42 The court considered whether the government's interest in the
pledged property was a "thing of value" within the meaning of section 64 1.
43
Because a security interest is an inchoate interest in property' over which
the government may never exercise dominion, the court determined that the
requisite federal control and supervision were absent.45 Accordingly, the
district court ruled that a security interest vested in the Department of Com-
merce was not a "thing of value,",4 6 and therefore, the defendant, who had
converted the property in which the government had the interest, did not
violate section 641.47
More significant than the holding of Tana was the caveat the court men-
tioned in dicta. Writing for the court, Judge Goettel warned that accepting
the Federal Government's allegation that conversion of a security interest
was a federal crime under section 641 permitted prosecution of "[a]nyone,
anywhere, who, knowingly or unknowingly, misappropriated" federal prop-
erty.48 Thus, Judge Goettel's words reiterated that the Federal Government
must prove that the property or funds in question were subject to sufficient
38. Id.; see United States v. Collins, 464 F.2d 1163, 1165 (9th Cir. 1972) (section 641
requires that the government suffer actual property loss).
39. Fleetwood, 489 F. Supp. at 132-33.
40. Id. at 132.
41. 618 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
42. Id. at 1395.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1397. The court reasoned that an inchoate, or partial, interest in assets was
insufficient to hold the defendants culpable under section 641 because the assets never actually
were United States property. Id.
46. Id. at 1395. The court determined that the Federal Government merely anticipated
an interest in the "thing" and therefore, the government did not exercise the requisite control).
Id.
47. Id. at 1397.
48. Id. Despite this judicial warning, the legislature expanded the federal criminal law by
enacting 18 U.S.C. § 666.
[Vol. 39:673
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federal supervision and control49 to qualify as property of the United States
within the meaning of section 641.50 The court concluded that failure to
meet this supervision and control burden, even where a significant govern-
mental interest existed, removed federal jurisdiction5 and permitted the
theft of such nonfederal property to slip through the cracks of this federal
criminal theft statute.52
B. The Federal Bribery Statute: 18 US. C. § 201
Section 201 of title 18," which provides for the prosecution of individuals
engaging in bribery or making gratuitous offers to public officials, was of
limited assistance to the Federal Government in its efforts to thwart the brib-
ery of officials in programs receiving federal funds.54 In fact, restrictive judi-
cial interpretations of the statute's "public official" requirement seriously
curtailed the effectiveness of the provision.
Under section 201, an individual who influences or attempts to influence a
federal official by promising payment in exchange for improper conduct is in
violation of federal law. 5 Before invoking section 201, the statute requires
that the Federal Government prove that the person to whom the bribe is
offered is a public official, as defined by subsection 201(a)(1) of title 18.56 To
49. See cases cited supra note 33; Tana, 618 F. Supp. at 1396.
50. Tana, 618 F. Supp. at 1396; see also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369 (the require-
ment that the federal character of the stolen property be proved was the greatest weakness of
section 641), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3510.
51. Tana, 618 F. Supp. at 1396-97.
52. Id.; see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3510. According to Congress, the Federal Government's inability to estab-
lish the federal nature of the "thing" permitted defendants to avoid federal prosecution. Id.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988). This statute, entitled Bribery of Pubic Officials and Witnesses,
pertains to both bribery and gratuities. With regard to bribery, the section makes it a crime to
offer or promise anything of value to a public official to influence that official's actions or
induce the official to violate the law. Id. § 201(b)(l)(A), (B), (C). It is likewise unlawful under
the statute for a public official to accept such an offer or promise in return for being influenced
or induced to violate the law. Id § 201(b)(2)(A), (B), (C). The statute punishes gratuities by
fining or imprisoning any person who offers or promises anything of value to a public official as
a reward for an official act, id. § 201(f), and by fining or imprisoning any public official who
solicits compensation for an act, id. § 201(h). The statutory provisions apply to both "public
officials" and any "person who has been selected to be a public official," as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(a). See Note, Government Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: A Practical Guide to Fighting Offi-
cial Corruption, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1073-76 (1983) (focusing on the "public
official" requirement as the paramount element of the government's burden of proof under 18
U.S.C. § 201).
54. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369-70, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3510-11.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (1988).
56. Id. at § 201(a)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659, 662 (2d Cir.
1976) (same); United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 663 (2d Cir. 1975)(because the individ-
1990]
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determine whether an individual meets the public official criteria, courts fo-
cus on whether the person was "acting for or on behalf of the United
States.",57 Three United States Circuit Courts of Appeal decisions reflect the
shortcomings of the section's public official element.5"
1. Early Constructions of the "Public Official" Requirement
Two early cases that addressed the public official element of section 201 of
title 18 are United States v. Del Toro59 and United States v. Loschiavo. o
Both cases arose from the attempted bribery of Pedro Morales, the Deputy
Director of the Harlem-East Harlem Office of the New York Model Cities
Administration, 6 a federal housing program supervised and funded by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).6 2 Morales, a city-
level administrator of the federal program, was responsible for awarding
Model Cities leases to private contractors.6 3 Because Model Cities was a
federally created and funded program, the Federal Government invoked
subsections 201(b)(1) and (2) of title 18 to prosecute the defendants who
attempted to bribe Morales." These subsections provide for the prosecution
of individuals who attempt to influence the actions of public officials.
Although decided a year apart, the results of Del Toro and Loschiavo were
identical; the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that Morales was not a public official under section 201.65 The failure of the
government's prosecution 66 revealed a substantial loophole in the federal
bribery statute resulting solely from the public official requirement.
In Del Toro, the Second Circuit reasoned that despite Morales'
responsibility for administering federal funds, 67 he was merely a city
ual receiving the bribe was not a federal official, the defendants were not subject to the statute);
see also United States v. Hinton, 683 F.2d 195, 197-200 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendants' convic-
tions were dependent on the court's decision to classify them as federal employees), aff'd sub
nom. Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482 (1984).
57. Del Toro, 513 F.2d at 662 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1)).
58. United States v. Mosley, 659 F.2d 812, 814 (1981); Loschiavo, 531 F.2d at 659; Del
Toro, 513 F.2d at 656; S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369-70 (because section 201 only
punishes. bribery of public officials, those who bribe nonpublic officials escape prosecution
under the federal bribery statute, even if the bribed individual has the power to disburse federal
funds), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3510-11.
59. 513 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975).
60. 531 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1976).
61. Del Toro, 513 F.2d at 658; Loschiavo, 531 F.2d at 660.
62. Del Toro, 513 F.2d at 661-62.
63. Id. at 658; Loschiavo, 531 F.2d at 661.
64. Del Toro, 513 F.2d at 660-61; Loschiavo, 531 F.2d at 661.
65. Del Toro, 513 F.2d at 662; Loschiavo, 531 F.2d at 661.
66. Del Toro, 513 F.2d at 662.
67. Id. at 661.
[Vol. 39:673
Section 666
employee,6 8 and therefore outside the scope of section 201.69 The court
based this decision on a series of factors. First, the court noted that Morales
was a city employee, performing a duty assigned to him by another city
employee.7 ° Next, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the City of New
York, rather than the Federal Government, had the authority to approve
Morales' leasing decisions prior to the use of federal funds. 7 Finally, the
court recognized that HUD did not have the power to hire or fire individuals
in Morales' position.72 According to the Second Circuit, these factors out-
weighed the government's liberal reading of the "acting for or on behalf of
the United States" requirement of section 201(a).7" In addition, the Second
Circuit considered the government's prosecution incomplete, 74 because it
failed to prove that Morales acted for or on behalf of the United States, or
"under or by authority of" the Federal Government. 75 In conclusion, the
court reasoned that the relationship between the employee and the Federal
Government was of greater importance than the actual infrastructure and
operation of the particular project.7 6
In 1981, six years after Del Toro, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit examined the public official requirement in United States
v. Mosley.7 7 Mosley, an Intake and Eligibility Officer hired by the State of
Illinois Bureau of Employment, screened applicants for jobs provided by the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). 7' The government
charged Mosley with accepting gratuities in exchange for preferential treat-
ment of certain applicants. 79 In rejecting Mosley's claim that, as a state
68. Id. at 662.
69. Id. The court carefully noted that although Morales may have been acting on behalf
of the United States, he was not acting under its authority. The fact that the government could
not hire or fire people in Morales' position, and that the city had to approve Morales' plans
before federal funds were requested, supported the court's conclusion. Id. Because Morales
was not subject to federal authority, the court reasoned that he was outside the category of
federal "public official," as defined by Congress. Id.; see also Note, supra note 53, at 1074
(discussing issue of whether state employees involved with federal programs may be section
201 "public officials").
70. Del Toro, 513 F.2d at 662.
71. Id.
72. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d at 661.
73. Del Toro, 513 F.2d at 663.
74. Id. at 662.
75. Id. at 662-663 (referring to the standard articulated at 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)).
76. Id. at 661.
77. 659 F.2d 812 (7th Cir. 1981).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 801 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
79. Mosley, 659 F.2d at 813. The Federal Government indicted Mosley under section
201(g) of title 18, which provides for the prosecution of any public official who solicits or
demands "anything of value" as payment for an "official act performed or to be performed by
[him]." 18 U.S.C. § 201(g).
1990]
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employee, he was not a federal public official,"° the Seventh Circuit ruled
that the "substantial amount of federal Government involvement" 8' in
CETA indicated that Mosley acted "for or on behalf of the United States
Department of Labor." 2 Although the state hired Mosley and classified
him as a state employee, the United States Government paid his salary and
funded the program that he administered. 3 This arrangement, coupled with
the program's federal objectives, led the Seventh Circuit to determine that
Mosley was "a substitute for a federal employee."
814
2. "Public Official" as a Public Trustee
The Supreme Court of the United States provided a new approach to the
public official requirement of section 201 in Dixson v. United States. 8 5 The
United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois convicted
Dixson and a co-defendant, Hinton, for soliciting money in exchange for
awarding housing contracts funded by the Federal Government8 6 pursuant
to the Housing and Community Development Act.87 In affirming the con-
viction," the Supreme Court established a test for determining whether a
defendant is a public official pursuant to federal criminal law. Specifically,
the Court focused on whether the individual at issue occupied "a position of
public trust with federal responsibilities."8 9 The Court established that an
individual falling within the parameters of this broader definition of public
official is subject to the penalties of section 201 of title 18.9 o
80. Mosley, 659 F.2d at 814.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 815.
84. Id.; see also Note, supra note 53, at 1074-75 ("Mosley's responsibility to exercise dis-
cretion to act for and on behalf of the government," as well as the significant government
involvement in the program, supported the court's holding that Mosley was a public official.).
85. 465 U.S. 482 (1984). See Note, supra note 53, at 1075 (providing a brief synopsis of
the rationale behind the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Hinton, 683 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Dixson v. United States,
465 U.S. 482 (1984), wherein the Seventh Circuit echoed the reasoning of the Mosley court,
and held that the discretionary power of Hinton and Dixon in administering federal monies
was sufficient to meet the section 201 public official requirement).
86. Hinton, 683 F.2d at 196. The convictions of Dixson and Hinton rested on subsections
(c)(l) and (2) of section 201 of title 18. The statute provides for the prosecution of those
individuals, selected to be public officials, who accept bribes in the course of their official duty.
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1), (2).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1982).
88. Dixson, 465 U.S. at 501.




In dicta, however, the Court appended both a limitation and warning to
its decision in Dixson. Although Dixson and Hinton were found to be public
officials, the Court warned that "the mere presence of some federal assist-
ance [does not] bring[ ] a local organization and its employees within the
jurisdiction of the federal bribery statute." 91 Rather, the Court emphasized
that section 201 mandates that the individual administering a federal pro-
gram must possess some degree of discretion and official responsibility.92
This limitation, which the Court stated in dicta, provided defendants with a
loophole in section 201, thus weakening the overall potency of the statute.
In interpreting section 641 and section 201, the courts have not rendered
the statutes powerless. Both statutes continue to serve an important purpose
and play an integral part in protecting the Federal Government's interests
against theft and bribery. However, judicial interpretations of these statutes
have imposed serious limitations on their effectiveness in deterring certain
acts of theft and bribery.9 3 The supervision and control requirement of sec-
tion 641 and the public official limitation of section 201 force the United
States to trace the stolen or embezzled property and link the bribed individ-
ual directly to the Federal Government or a federal program. The govern-
ment's difficulty in meeting these requirements spurred Congress into
enacting a new, more inclusive, federal criminal statute to handle theft and
bribery problems in federally funded programs.9 4
II. CLOSING THE HOLES: THE NEW FEDERAL THEFT
AND BRIBERY STATUTE
A. Removal of the "Property of the United States" Condition
in Theft Prosecution
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (the Act),95 containing
section 666 of title 18,96 was the culmination of legislative activity that began
91. Id. at 499.
92. Id. at 499-500.
93. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3510.
94. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3510-11. At the same time that section 666 was enacted, the district courts and
courts of appeal enforced a narrow definition of section 201's public official requirement. Soon
after the enactment of the new legislation, the Supreme Court broadened the definition by
including those individuals acting as "public trustees" within the scope of section 201. See
United States v. Dixson, 465 U.S. 482 (1984).
95. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2143 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C.).
96. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1988). The section is entitled Theft or Bribery Concerning
Programs Receiving Federal Funds
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in the 1960's. 97 While much of the Act simply reformed existing federal
criminal law,98 Congress also supplemented those amendments with addi-
tional provisions designed to address white collar crime.99
In enacting section 666 of title 18, Congress intended to "augment the
ability of the United States to vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud and
bribery involving Federal" money distributed to private organizations, state
or local governments,1°" or Indian tribal governments 1°' through federal
programs or grants.' 0 2 Congress modeled the theft provision of section 666
after section 665 of title 18,103 another federal statute which creates a federal
offense for acts of theft or embezzlement by an officer or employee of any
agency receiving assistance under CETA or the Job Partnership Training
Act."° Other than section 665, no federal theft statute was specifically tai-
lored to protect funds that Congress disburses through specific federal pro-
grams.'o 5 Thus, prior to section 666, the government was forced to ground
prosecutions for theft on section 641,106 the general theft provision.'
0 7
Therefore, Congress determined that a statutory provision patterned after
the extensive scope of section 665 was the logical means of closing the gaps
identified by the courts in broader federal theft and bribery statutes.
97. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2143 (1984); see K. FEINBERG & S. SCHREIBER, supra
note 9, at 250. "[T]he fact is that the bulk of the new statute was not sprung on an unsuspect-
ing Congress but, rather, has a long history going back to the late 1960's." Id.
98. K. FEINBERG & S. SCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 250. The Act represents the combina-
tion of various congressional efforts at remaking the federal criminal code.
99. Id.
100. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3510. See, e.g., United States v. Little, 687 F. Supp. 1042, 1049 (N.D. Miss. 1988)
("[T]he purpose of section 666 is to fill the gaps in the federal criminal law caused by section
201 [and section 641].").
101. Pub. L. No. 99-646, 100 Stat. 6138 (1986). This amendment expanded the scope of
section 666 to include an agent of an Indian tribal government.
102. S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 726 (1981). The statute was designed to "rem-
edy a gap" in prior federal criminal laws. Id.
103. Id.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 665 (1982).
105. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3510; S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 726 (1981) (CETA was the only
organization with a theft statute tailored to its need. Other federal programs or agencies relied
on section 641, which had the onerous "property of the United States" requirement.).
106. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3510.
107. For a full discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 641, see supra notes 16-52 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 39:673
Section 666
By enacting subsections 666(a)(1)(A)' 08 and (b),'0 9 Congress eliminated
the problems inherent in section 641 by lessening the government's burden
of proof. The statute's language indicates that in order to bring a defendant
within its jurisdictional parameters, the government must demonstrate that
the defendant and the defendant's organization satisfy four criteria. 1 o First,
the defendant must be the agent of an organization or a state, local, or tribal
government.1 1 ' As defined by the statute, an agent is one who possesses the
authority "to act on behalf of another person or a government,"' 1 2 such as
an employee, director, manager, or representative." 3 Second, the organiza-
tion or government for whom the defendant is an agent must receive from a
federal assistance program an amount in excess of $10,000 in any one
year.1 4 Third, the types of programs falling under the statute's protection
include grants, government contracts, and subsidies." 5 Finally, the govern-
ment must establish that the defendant embezzled, stole, fraudulently ob-
tained, or willingly converted property," 6 worth at least $5,000,' under
the control, care, or supervision of the agency or government of the defend-
ant's employ." "
108. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A) (1988). This portion of the statute states that:
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of this section ex-
ist-
(1) being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal
government, or any agency thereof-
(A) embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without authority
knowingly converts to the use of any person other than the rightful owner or inten-
tionally misapplies, property that-
(i) is valued at $5,000 or more, and
(ii) is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control of such organi-
zation, government, or agency; or ....
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
Id.
109. Id. § 666(b). Section 666(b) states: "The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of
this section is that the organization, government, or agency receives, in any one year period,
benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan,
guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance." Id. (emphasis added).
110. See generally id. § 666(a)(l)(A), (b), supra notes 108 and 109.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1).
112. Id. § 666(d)(1). Subsection (d) provides definitions of terms in section 666. Subsec-
tion 666(d)(1) defines an "agent" as a person who is "authorized to act on behalf of another
person or a government and, in the case of an organization or government, includes a servant
or employee, and a partner, director, officer, manager, and representative." Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. § 666(b). For the full text of this subsection, see supra note 109.
115. Id.
116. Id. § 666(a)(l)(A). For the full text of this subsection, see supra note 108.
117. Id. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i). For the full text of this subsection, see supra note 108.
118. Id. § 666(a)(1)(A)(ii). For the full text of this subsection, see supra note 108.
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In contrast to section 641, section 666(a)(1)(A) does not require the gov-
ernment to demonstrate that the stolen or converted property was of a fed-
eral character. "9 The statute is concerned not with the relationship between
the Federal Government and the converted property, but rather with the
relationship between the Federal Government and the agency or government
from which the property was stolen. Congress apparently concluded that a
strong interest in protecting federal program money leads to an equally
strong interest in maintaining the integrity of the organization or govern-
ment controlling the monies.1 20 In an effort to protect this interest, Con-
gress wove a large net potentially affecting all individuals employed by an
entity having access to section 666 property. 12  Furthermore, by focusing
on the nonfederal entity, rather than the property, Congress hoped to elimi-
nate the reluctance of local prosecutors to safeguard federal program mon-
ies. 122 Just as the Federal Government is more dedicated to protecting
federal interests, local law enforcement officials would be more inclined to
take the prosecutorial initiative when a state or local organization was the
victim of the theft. 1
23
The monetary threshold requirements of section 666 constitute a signifi-
cant limitation on the otherwise broad scope of the statute. 124 Congress in-
cluded these restricting features "to insure against an unwarranted
expansion of Federal jurisdiction into areas of little Federal interest."'125
Moreover, Congress limited the scope of section 666 to crimes involving sub-
stantial monetary amounts in order to curtail excessive federal intervention
into state and local matters. The statute's scope is further limited by the
definition of "federal programs." 126 All federal programs are not within the
scope of section 666. Specifically, Congress included only those programs
for which there "exist[s] a specific statutory scheme authorizing the Federal
assistance in order to promote or achieve certain policy objectives."'
121
119. See id.; cf 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988). For the full text of section 641, see supra note 14.
120. See generally S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 726 (1981). Congress reasoned
that although the monies used in the programs were not federal, the government still retained
'a strong interest in assuring" their integrity. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. Congress stated that, in its opinion, "[s]tate and local prosecutors [were] often not
inclined to commit their limited resources ... deeming the United States" the only injured
party. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 666.
125. S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 726 (1981).





B. Elimination of the "Public Official" Requirement in Bribery
Prosecutions
Section 666 attacks bribery in much the same way that it attacks theft.'28
The paramount focus under the bribery sections of 666, namely sections
666(a)(1)(B) 29 and 666(a)(2), 3 ' is the relationship between the person re-
ceiving the bribe and the organization or government benefiting from the
federal funds.131 Under the statute, the amount or type of bribe is immate-
rial.' 32 The structure of the statute and the elements of the crime reflect
congressional intent to reach more acts of bribery than section 201, which
prohibits illegal payments to federal public officials.' 33
Under subsection 666(a)(1)(B),' 34 a federal offense occurs when any agent
corruptly solicits or demands on behalf of another person 135 or "accepts or
128. A comparison of the two statutes reveals that the key to each is the establishment of a
federal characteristic. Under the theft statute, the stolen property must be federal in nature
and according to the bribery provisions, the individual bribed must be linked to the Federal
Government.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (1988). This portion of the statute states:
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of this section ex-
ists-
(1) being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal
government, or any agency thereof-
(B) corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts
or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or
rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of
such organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or
more; ...
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id. § 666(a)(2). This subsection provides that:
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of this section ex-
ists-
(2) corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any person,
with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization or of a State, local or
Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof, in connection with any business,
transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency
involving anything of value of $5,000 or more; ...
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
Id. (emphasis added).
131. See id. § 666(a)(1)(B), (b).
132. See id. § 666(a)(2).
133. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3510.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(l)(B). For the full text of this subsection, see supra note 129.
135. Id.
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agrees to accept anything of value" as a reward 136 for an action connected to
the business or activities of the agency or government, 117 so long as the
transaction is valued at $5,000 or more. 138  The language of subsection
666(a)(1)(B) suggests three potential conclusions. First, the statute on its
face does not require that federal funds be involved in the transaction or that
the person receiving the bribe have any connection to a federal program. 
1 39
The statute suggests that the government may obtain a bribery conviction so
long as the agency or government employing the agent benefits under a fed-
eral program. Second, the statute does not require that the bribe itself affect
the specific division, department, or branch of the agency or government
that benefits from the federal program. 4" Thus, pursuant to the statute, any
bribe of any employee appears to fulfill this prerequisite, provided the entity
has a general link to the government through a benefit program.' 41 Third,
the statute states that the bribe can be "anything of value."' 42 While this
language is subject to judicial interpretation, the most logical inference, and
indeed one accepted by the courts, is that any monetary amount, piece of
property, or other interest qualifies as something of value under section
666.143
The framework of subsection 666(a)(1)(B), which punishes an agent for
seeking a bribe, is also found in section 666(a)(2), which punishes the indi-
vidual offering the bribe. 1" Section 666(a)(2), however, requires intent. The
express language of this subsection requires that the person offering the bribe
must intend to influence or reward the person whom he attempts to bribe. 145
In this regard, Congress included in section 666 the mens rea element re-
quired by section 201.146 In addition, courts interpret the statutory language
"in connection with any business, transaction or series of transactions" to
require only that the bribe occur during the ordinary course of business of
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id. § 666(a)(2) (the plain language of the statute does not require that either the
briber or the individual bribed be "federal").
140. See id. § 666(a)(1)(B), (2) (the statute does not require that the bribe be motivated by
the desire to influence a federal program).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 666(a)(l)(B).
143. See United States v. Little, 687 F. Supp. 1042, 1050 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (the item given
as a bribe need not have a specific worth or value).
144. See 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). Both subsections, 666(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2), pertain to brib-
ery. The former creates an offense for the individual demanding or accepting the bribe; the
latter creates an offense for the individual offering or giving the bribe.
145. Id.
146. Id.; cf id. § 201(b). For the text of section 201(b), see supra note 13.
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the entity receiving federal funds.147 "Anything of value" means any prop-
erty or item,"' a similarly de minimis standard.
The general purpose of the bribery subsections, 666(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2), as
with the theft section, is to protect "money distributed pursuant to Federal
programs from undue influence."' 49 Again, Congress sought to achieve this
goal by shifting the statute's focus from the link between the individual being
bribed and the United States to the relationship between the individual's
employer, whether a private organization or governmental entity, and the
Federal Government.150 In effect, Congress created a criminal offense that
treats nonfederal entities that receive federal monies as federal agencies for
the purpose of bribery and theft. Thus, the statute suggests that a relation-
ship between the private organization or governmental entity and the Fed-
eral Government, resulting from a federal grant or benefit program, opens
the door to federal jurisdiction over any employee of that entity, regardless
of any specific connection that employee might have to either the federal
program or the Federal Government.'-'
Neither an examination of the limited legislative history pertaining to sec-
tion 666 nor a strict analysis of the statutory language gives an accurate
description of the true force and effect of the statute. Section 666's scope
and the extent to which it fulfills the congressional goal of augmenting the
federal theft and bribery statutes depends on both judicial interpretation and
the manner in which prosecutors choose to employ the statute.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Jackowe, 651 F. Supp. 1035, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)(section
666 requires only that the defendant attempt to "influence the recipient's conduct in the course
of his employ").
148. See Little, 687 F. Supp. at, 1050. In discussing the "anything of value" language, the
court states that the thing given, in the bribery context, or stolen, in a theft scenario, need not
have a specific or ascertainable worth, so long as the transaction or series of transactions that
lead to a bribe has a value of $5,000 or more. Id.
149. S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 726, 803 (1981). The statute is designed to
punish individuals or entities disbursing federal monies as a result of bribery or other outside
influence.
150. See, e.g., Little, 687 F. Supp. at 1049 (noting that local or state officials, although they
controlled large sums of federal funds, could not be prosecuted under section 201 because they
were not federal public officials).
151. See United States v. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Westmore-
land, 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1988); Little, 687 F. Supp. at 1048-52; United States v. Sadlier,
649 F. Supp. 1560 (D. Mass. 1986).
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III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 666: PRECISION TOOL OR
CATCHALL NET
A. Statutory Interpretations of Section 666
Federal court decisions interpreting section 666 are limited because of the
statute's relative infancy. 152 However, the existing case law indicates that
federal courts have construed the statute broadly and have embraced its
lower threshold of proof.'53 These existing cases illustrate the usefulness' 54
and limitations"' of section 666.
1. Bolstering Government Prosecutions Through Application of
Section 666
a. Eliminating the Requirement of Tracing Stolen Property to the
Government for Section 666 Prosecutions
According to two federal courts that have reviewed the statute's scope,
section 666 does not require the Federal Government to trace the embezzled
or stolen property to a federal program.' 56 In United States v. Smith, 157 the
United States Government, relying on section 666, indicted the supervisor of
Newton County, Mississippi, for accepting bribes.158 The county received
federal benefits in excess of $10,000."' The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Mississippi held the statute applicable"6° and re-
jected the defendant's claim that section 666 applied only when federal
money was used in the bribe.' 6 ' The court determined, in light of the avail-
able legislative history, that tracing the bribe to specific federal funds is not
an essential element of proving a crime under section 666. 162 The court con-
cluded that the plain meaning of the statute indicated that the bribery of a
152. To date, there are only nine published opinions dealing with section 666. For a com-
plete list of each circuit or district court which addressed the statute and the name of the
reported cases, see infra notes 225 and 226.
153. See, e.g., Little, 687 F. Supp. at 1049 (the court interpreted the legislative history to
indicate that section 666 expanded the reach of the federal criminal law); see generally United
States v. Smith, 695 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (applying section 666 to a county
supervisor).
154. See generally Duvall, 846 F.2d 966; Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572.
155. See generally United States v. Webb, 691 F. Supp. 1164 (N.D. Ill. 1988); United States
v. Jackowe, 651 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
156. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at 578; Smith, 659 F. Supp. at 835.
157. 659 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 835.
161. Id. at 834.
162. Id. at 835. After analyzing the available legislative history, the court stated that
"[s]ection 666 was designed to fill a gap which the difficulty of tracing federal monies caused."
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local government agent employed by a government receiving in excess of
$10,000 in federal benefits was sufficient.
163
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in United States
v. Westmoreland, "' echoed the finding of the Smith court. In Westmore-
land, the court upheld the conviction of a county supervisor whose county
benefited from over $10,000 in federal program monies.16 5 The court noted
that nothing in section 666 indicated that "any transaction" actually meant
"any federally funded transaction." 166 The court asserted that the legislative
history of section 666,167 which reflected congressional intent to enhance
prosecutorial efforts by eliminating the difficult task of tracing federal funds,
supported its finding. 1 6' By dispensing with the requirement that the illegal
act be linked to the Federal Government, section 666 permits the govern-
ment to retain jurisdiction over and monitor nonfederal employees who ad-
minister federal funds not otherwise under federal control and supervision.
The Fifth Circuit further held that it is reasonable to protect federal mon-
ies with a statute that does not require proof that federal funds were used in
the illegal act.69 Because not all programs use the same bureaucratic
processes, proving the federal character of the offense could lead to inconsis-
tent prosecutions and protective measures.1 70 Therefore, the court deter-
mined that, because of the various ways the different federal programs
disburse and administer funds, eliminating the tracing element was a reason-
able method for Congress to protect federal monies.17 1 As reflected by the
Smith and Westmoreland decisions, the elimination of the Federal Govern-
ment's need to trace the bribe or stolen property to the United States permits
section 666 to reach offenses outside the scope of section 641.
b. Imposing a Threshold Requirement for the Value of the Stolen or
Embezzled Property for Section 666 Prosecutions
Section 666's requirement that the bribe be connected with any transac-
tion worth at least $5,000 also has been subject to judicial review. Under the
Id. Interpreting section 666 to require tracing bribes to a specific federal program would un-
dermine Congress' goal of broadening the scope of section 201. Id.
163. Id.
164. 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 62 (1988).
165. Id. at 574.
166. Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369 (Congress reported that the Govern-
ment's inability to establish the federal nature of certain stolen property hampered federal
prosecutorial efforts), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3510).
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language of section 666, the stolen or embezzled property must have a value
of $5,000.172 Furthermore, federal courts interpreting the $5,000 threshold
requirement have permitted the government to aggregate offenses in order to
achieve the $5,000 amount, so long as the "multiple conversions were part of
a single scheme." 17' By permitting the aggregation of the amounts involved
in the transactions, federal courts have prevented those who repeatedly steal
small amounts of property from escaping the purview of section 666.174
Determining whether the statute intended to require the $5,000 threshold
amount to apply to the bribe or to the transaction giving rise to the bribe is
not clear on the face of the statute. 175 However, the courts have determined
that the $5,000 requirement applies to the amount of business conducted by
the organization or government, 176 not the amount of the bribe. 177 In
United States v. Duvall, 17 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit stated that the plain meaning of the statute mandated conviction of a
defendant who accepted "anything of value." 179 Likewise, in United States
v. Little, 180 the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi held that section 666 did not include a facial requirement that
the bribe be $5,000 in value.' 8" The court further asserted that the statute's
focus on the agency or employer's business dealings, rather than on the
agent or employee and the amount of the bribe, was the logical interpreta-
tion of section 666, given Congress' desire to fill the gaps in section 201.182
172. See 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(l)(A)(i) (1988). For the text of this subsection, see supra note
108.
173. United States v. Webb, 691 F. Supp. 1164, 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The court's decision
to permit aggregation to reach the $5,000 floor required by section 666 rested on prior case law
permitting a series of misdemeanor larcenies to be aggregated to create a felony larceny, if
there is continuing intent. See United States v. Billingslea, 603 F.2d 515, 520 n.6 (5th Cir.
1979).
174. Webb, 691 F. Supp. at 1168. Criminals cannot escape prosecution even if each theft is
less than $5,000 when the thefts are part of a single plan or scheme.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Little, 687 F. Supp. 1042, 1049-50 (N.D. Miss. 1988)(much
of the court's energy focused on whether the $5,000 described the bribe or the transaction
giving rise to the bribe).
176. Id. at 1050; see also United States v. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966, 976 (5th Cir. 1988).
177. Duvall, 846 F.2d at 976; Little, 687 F. Supp. at 1050. The Duvall court, relying on
simple statutory interpretation, stated that "It]he wording of the section does not place a value
on the bribe." Duvall, 846 F.2d at 976.
178. 846 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1988).
179. Id. at 976.
180. 687 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Miss. 1988).
181. Id. at 1050.
182. Id. at 1049. This court, like other courts interpreting section 666, relied on congres-
sional intent as manifested in the limited legislative history of S. 1620 and S. 1762. The pur-
pose of section 666, according to both Congress and the court, is to bring those state and local
officials or agents who administer federal funds within the jurisidiction of the federal criminal
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Another aspect of section 666, further enhancing the statute's protective
force, is the government's ability to apply it in conjunction with other stat-
utes.18 3 In United States v. Sadlier, 184 the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts permitted prosecution of a defendant under
the Medicare Fraud and Kickback Act (Medicare Fraud Act)185 and the
bribery portion of section 666.186 The district court's decision to allow pros-
ecution under both statutes rested on two lines of reasoning. 87 First, the
district court relied on Supreme Court precedent permitting the United
States to prosecute a defendant under two separate criminal statutes if the
elements of proof required by the two statutes differed.' 8 Because violation
of the Medicare Fraud Act requires a kickback specifically involving Medi-
care,18 9 and section 666 requires that the person receiving the kickback be
employed by an organization receiving at least $10,000 in benefits,' 90 the
court determined that the two statutes created distrinct criminal offenses.' 9 1
An alternative rationale relied upon by the Sadlier court stemmed directly
from the court's analysis of the legislative history of section 666. The court
opined that because Congress intended section 666 to create a new of-
fense, 192 the statute did more than simply strengthen other statutes;193 it
stood apart as an independent offense.' 94
2. Constraining the Government's Prosecutions Under Section 666
Although the Federal Government has benefited from broad judicial inter-
pretation of section 666, the statute is not one of unlimited scope. Two fed-
eral courts have imposed constraints on section 666 that limit its
law. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3510.
183. See United States v. Sadlier, 649 F. Supp. 1560, 1562 (D. Mass. 1986).
184. 649 F. Supp. at 1560.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(l)(B) (1982).
186. Sadlier, 649 F. Supp. at 1564.
187. Id. at 1562-64.
188. In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the United States Supreme
Court announced the test for determining whether a defendant can be charged with multiple
counts for one offense: "[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two
distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses
or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id.
at 304
189. Sadlier, 649 F. Supp. at 1562.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1563.
192. Id. (citing Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
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effectiveness. Specifically, these courts have required that the government
prove the defendant possessed specific intent to bribe the recipient, 195 and
that the entity disbursing the federal funds derive some benefit from those
funds. 196
a. Requiring Specific Intent for Section 666 Prosecutions
In United States v. Jackowe,197 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that in order to obtain a conviction
under the bribery subsection of 666 the United States must prove that the
defendant intended to "influence the recipient's conduct." '198 In Jackowe,
the United States prosecuted a nonfederal employee for bribery.1 99 The dis-
trict court held that congressional failure to mention a specific intent re-
quirement did not eliminate that element of the government's burden of
proof.
20°
Furthermore, the district court reasoned that imposing an intent element
eliminates two potential constitutional challenges to the statute.20  First, the
court recognized that if the intent element of section 666 was ambiguous, a
defendant could raise a due process claim based on lack of appropriate no-
tice.20 2 Second, the court noted that Congress' failure to include an intent
element in the statute permits a nonfederal employee, convicted under the
bribery portion of section 666, to claim a violation of equal protection be-
cause a federal employee convicted under section 201, the federal bribery
statute, could be treated differently for the same offense.20 3 In particular,
the district court opined that a nonfederal employee might argue that the
penalty for giving a gift in a section 666 scenario, which can result in a fine
and/or a maximum of ten years in prison,2°1 is disproportionately more se-
vere than the punishment imposed on a federal employee convicted of the
identical offense under section 201(f), 20 5 which can result in a fine plus a
195. See United States v. Jackowe, 651 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
196. See United States v. Webb, 691 F. Supp. 1164 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
197. 651 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
198. Id. at 1036.
199. Id. at 1035.
200. Id. at 1036 (citing United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (the omission
of intent in the wording of a criminal statute does not eliminate intent as an element of the
offense)). Because the bribery portion of section 201 includes an intent element, it is logical for
section 666, which deals with the same offense, to have the same intent requirement. Id.
201. Id. The court recognized that the punishment provided under the bribery subsection
of 666 was on par with that of the bribery, as opposed to the gratuity, subsection of 201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1), (2) (1988). Bribery and theft have equivalent penalties.
205. United States v. Jackowe, 651 F. Supp. 1035, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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maximum of two years in prison.2 ° 6 Thus, the court determined that specific
intent, although unstated, was a necessary prerequisite to a conviction pur-
suant to section 666.
b. Establishing a Benefit Requirement for Section 666 Prosecutions
In United States v. Webb,207 the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois refused to apply section 666 to an accounting firm, Hill and Com-
pany (Hill Taylor),2 °a which managed and disbursed funds to landlords se-
lected by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2" The
district court interpreted section 666 to include a requirement210 that an en-
tity disbursing the funds derive a direct benefit from those funds.21" ' The
court recognized that the accounting firm was not a beneficiary of the federal
program or the federal funds,212 but was merely a repository for the funds
while awaiting federally-determined allocation.21 3 Thus, acknowledging
that section 666 might constitute "a significant intrusion of federal law en-
forcement into traditional areas of local concern,"21 the court recognized
Congress' limitation on the statute's scope and restricted its reach to offenses
involving organizations or governments that receive a benefit from the fed-
eral funds.215
In addition, the district court reasoned that because the accounting firm
never exercised control over the distribution of the funds, 216 the funds re-
mained federal property217 and subject to the theft sanction of section
641 .218 The court asserted that because section 641 provided a sufficient
means of punishment, the prosecution of Hill Taylor under section 666
206. 18 U.S.C. § 201(f)-(i) (1988). The offenses described in these subsections receive
equal punishments: a fine of not more than $10,000, or two years in prison, or both.
207. 691 F. Supp. 1164 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
208. Id. at 1165.
209. Id.
210. See 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1988).
211. Webb, 691 F. Supp. at 1169. Although the court does not say that direct benefit is an
absolute qualification of section 666, the court refused to apply the statute to these defendants
because they received no direct benefit. Id
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id at 1168. According to the court, legislative limitations were placed on section 666
because Congress knew that the legislation caused an intrusion of federal criminal law into an
area traditionally reserved to the states. Id. In order to curtail this usurpation of state author-
ity, Congress limited section 666's applicability. The direct benefit requirement is another
method of limiting the scope of section 666.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1169-70.
217. Id. at 1170.
218. Id.
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would be outside the scope of the statute.2 9 In reaching this decision, the
court acknowledged that Congress intended section 666 to augment, not re-
place, existing federal theft law.2 2° The Webb decision indicates that, despite
the presence of section 666, courts still invoke section 641 to vindicate acts
of theft perpetrated against the government.
B. Constitutional Interpretations of Section 666
United States v. Little22 1 presented the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Mississippi with a constitutional challenge to sec-
tion 666. In Little, the United States charged the defendants with bribery
and mail fraud.2 22 The defendant, in turn, counterclaimed against the
United States, alleging that section 666 was vague and overbroad.2 23 Be-
cause the defendants presented no evidence to support their contentions,
however, the court refused to speculate as to the statute's possible constitu-
tional flaws.224
The exact scope of section 666 cannot be measured solely by evaluating
existing case law because, to date, the United States Supreme Court has not
reviewed any of the aforementioned decisions nor handed down any decision
otherwise discussing section 666. Furthermore, the available case law re-
flects the opinions of only three federal circuit courts of appeal22- and five
federal district courts.226 Thus, the full scope and effect of section 666 is still
unsettled.
219. Id. While the court acknowledged the section's broad scope, it refused "to stretch the
term 'receives .. .benefits' beyond recognition, particularly where doing so would merely
make [section] 666 redundant of other federal statutes." Id.
220. Id. The court stated that since the funds remained in a federal account until disbursed
by Hill Taylor, theft of those funds constitutes theft of government property, punishment for
which is provided by section 641.
221. 687 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Miss. 1988).
222. Id. at 1043.
223. Id. at 1051.
224. Id. at 1052. In a footnote, the Little court found no constitutional shortcomings:
"'[lit is clear that Congress has cast a broad net to encompass local officials who may adminis-
ter federal funds regardless of whether they actually do.'" Id. at 1049 n.5 (quoting United
States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572, 577 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 62 (1988)).
225. The only circuit court opinions addressing section 666 are from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572, and United States v.
Duvall, 846 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1988); the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in United States v. Bordallo, 857 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1988)(holding section 666 does not
apply to the former governor of Guam because Guam is not a "state" for the purposes of the
bribery section); and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in United
States v. Barquin, 799 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1986)(moot because of enactment of Pub. L. No. 99-
646, 100 Stat. 6138 (1986) adding Indian tribes to the scope of section 666).
226. Five federal district courts have also dealt with section 666: the Northern District of
Illinois (United States v. Webb, 691 F. Supp. 1164 (N.D. Ill. 1988)); the District of Massachu-
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C. A Retrospective Application of Section 666 to Cases Decided Under
Sections 641 and 201
Due to the limited case law that exists regarding section 666 of title 18, the
full scope of the statute cannot be discerned. However, one method for as-
sessing the scope of section 666 is via a retrospective analysis applying the
new statute to the earlier section 641 and 201 cases. While such a method is
theoretical, it presents the opportunity to speculate whether a defendant,
who escaped conviction under section 641 or 201, might otherwise have been
successfully prosecuted under section 666.
As previously noted, in United States v. Del Toro2" the defendants
avoided conviction under section 201 because the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that Morales, the individual al-
legedly bribed, was not a public official.228 Although not a public official,
Morales was responsible for administering funds provided by HUD pursuant
to Model Cities, a low-income housing program.229 Applying the criteria of
section 666 to the Del Toro case, a district court would likely find sufficient
statutory authority to convict Del Toro and his codefendant of bribery.
While not within the ambit of section 201, Del Toro's actions would likely
fall within the prohibitions of section 666 because the latter statute does not
contain a public official requirement.2 3° Under section 666, Morales' em-
ployment by an organization that disbursed federal funds would be sufficient
to sustain a bribery conviction.2 31  Thus, applying section 666 to Del Toro
illustrates that the relationship between the government and the entity re-
ceiving the funds is the linchpin of the statute's applicability.
232
setts (United States v. Sadlier, 649 F. Supp. 1560 (D. Mass. 1986)); the Southern and Northern
Districts of Mississippi (United States v. Smith, 659 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Miss. 1987); United
States v. Little, 687 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Miss 1988)); and the Southern District of New York
(United States v. Jackowe, 651 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
227. 513 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975). For a more thorough discussion of Del Toro, see supra
notes 59-76 and accompanying text.
228. Id. at 662.
229. Id.
230. A comparison between the language of section 666 and section 201 demonstrates that
only the latter contains a "public official" requirement. For the complete text of section 666,
see supra notes 108, 129, and 130. For the complete text of the applicable portion of section
201, see supra note 13.
231. Under section 666(a)(2), Morales' employment in an agency disbursing federal funds
is sufficient to obtain a conviction of the individuals who attempted to bribe him. For a com-
plete discussion of section 666(a)(2), see supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
232. For a detailed explanation of the benefits of 18 U.S.C. § 666 as the new weapon in
fighting certain types of theft and bribery, see supra notes 95-151 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, in United States v. Little,233 the court interpreted section
666 to permit federal jurisdiction over individuals employed by state or local
governments that benefit from a federal program,234 especially if such indi-
viduals control the disbursal of the funds. Even under this interpretation,
Morales, having responsibility for the disbursal of HUD funds, and his code-
fendants, would have been convicted had section 666 been in effect. This
potential reversal in the outcome of the Del Toro case highlights the signifi-
cance section 666 places on the relationship between the Federal Govern-
ment and the beneficiary of the federal funds. Again, this hypothetical
demonstrates that the defendant's status as a public or private official is not
determinative of federal jurisdiction. Rather, the entity's status as an organi-
zation receiving federal monies permits the Federal Government to invoke
section 666.
Another example of section 666's potential effect on federal prosecutions
is apparent in a review of Dixson v. United States. 2 35 In Dixson, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the section 201 convictions of two defendants
who solicited bribes in exchange for preferential treatment in a federal pro-
gram they administered.2 36 Although the Supreme Court affirmed the con-
victions of the Dixson defendants, the majority decision defined "public
official" in such a way as to limit the applicability and scope of section
201 .237 The Court's restraint, which indicated that federal jurisdiction de-
pended on whether the employees of local organizations responsible for ad-
ministering or benefiting from federal funds have official responsibility or
duty related to those funds, appears moot in light of the absence of the pub-
lic official requirement in section 666.238
As with section 201, it is likely that certain cases decided under section
641 would have been decided differently had section 666 been the statute
233. 687 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Miss. 1988). For a complete discussion of Little, see supra
notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
234. Id. at 1049.
235. 465 U.S. 482 (1984); see also supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
236. Dixson, 465 U.S. 482.
237. Id. at 499. In the majority opinion in Dixson, Justice Marshall stated that:
By finding petitioners to be public officials ... we do not mean to suggest that the
mere presence of some federal assistance brings a local organization and its employ-
ees within the jurisdiction of the federal bribery statute or even that all employees...
responsible for administering federal grant programs are public officials .... To be a
public official.., an individual must possess some degree of official responsibility for
carrying out a federal program or policy.
Id at 500. As a result of the enactment of section 666, the above statement wilts. Under the
statute, the mere presence of federal monies in a state or local government or private organiza-
tion does indeed create federal jurisdiction over all employees.
238. See 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1988) (the section does not include "public official" as an ele-
ment of the crime of bribery).
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against which the court applied the facts. Section 666's elimination of the
requirement of federal supervision and control over the stolen property
likely would have influenced the court's rationale in United States v.
Smith. 239 In Smith, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
determined that the defendants were within the parameters of section 641
only after the United States demonstrated significant federal control and su-
pervision over the stolen work-study money.24° Under section 666, how-
ever, such a factor is irrelevant. 24  The new statute completely dispenses
with the supervision and control requirement, an essential element of proof
in prosecutions based on section 641. Moreover, there is no need to establish
a link between the Federal Government and the stolen property.242 Thus,
section 666 eliminated the requirement that the government prove supervi-
sion and control over the stolen or embezzled funds in certain theft prosecu-
243tions. In addition to eliminating the control and supervision
requirement,2 4 4 section 666 arguably negates the requirement that the gov-
ernment prove an actual loss, a necessary element in United States v. Fleet-
wood.245 Specifically, the statute requires only that the stolen property have
a minimum value of $5,000 and that it be stolen from an entity receiving
federal funds.246 Nowhere does section 666 indicate that the Federal Gov-
ernment must be adversely affected by the criminal act.
IV. A BEAST UNCHAINED: HAS SECTION 666 GONE Too FAR?
Clearly, section 666 is necessary for the protection of federal interests in
the state, local, and private arena. The legislative history of section 666 indi-
cates that white collar crime has a significant impact on programs and orga-
nizations receiving federal aid. 247 According to the United States Chamber
239. 596 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1979); see also supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
240. Smith, 596 F.2d at 664.
241. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A) (1988) (the theft subsection of the statute does
not require the Federal Government to have supervision and control over the stolen property).
For the full text of this subsection, see supra note 108.
242. See id.
243. See id. For a full discussion of this subsection, see supra text accompanying notes 108,
110, 116-28. See, e.g., United States v. Tana, 618 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (defendants
escaped prosecution because the government could not show substantial control or supervision
over a security interest); United States v. Fleetwood, 489 F. Supp. 129 (D. Oregon 1980) (a
government issued savings bond is not federal property, as defined by section 641 of title 18).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(l)(A).
245. 489 F. Supp. at 132.
246. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(l)(A). For the full text of this subsection, see supra
note 108.
247. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369-70, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3510-11. In all relevant legislative history, Congress stressed the need to
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of Commerce, approximately $40 billion is lost to white collar crime annu-
ally.24 As the section 666 cases demonstrate, the shortcomings of sections
641 and 201 in dealing with theft and bribery in federally funded programs
were too great to be left unaltered. However, section 666, in its current
form, poses additional questions as to whether it is the best tool to
strengthen the Federal Government's arsenal for the prosecution of theft,
fraud, and bribery involving federal funds.
Although section 666 symbolizes Congress' intent to close the gaps left
open by sections 641 and 201,249 the statute's broad language is amenable to
interpretations that create a potentially limitless scope. The statute's focus
on the relationship between the entity receiving the federal monies and the
Federal Government, rather than on the link between the individual defend-
ant and the government, raises unique problems. For example, a person who
has been bribed or who has committed theft might be subject to the statute's
sanctions solely by virtue of his employment status in a state or local govern-
ment or private organization benefiting from a federal program.
To illustrate this example, assume that a county government receives over
$10,000 in aid pursuant to a federal program, for use in improving that
county's highways. An individual working in the county's housing office,
who is unaware of either the federal program or the grant, accepts a bribe in
the course of a transaction valued at over $5,000. Despite the fact that the
bribe may concern purely local matters and may be totally unrelated to the
federal program, the clerk may be subject to sanctions under section 666.
While this conclusion appears both reasonable and defensible, based upon
the statutory language of section 666, it does not seem to reflect or effectuate
Congress' stated goal of enhancing the protection of federal monies dis-
bursed to governments and private organizations.2 5 The funds earmarked
for use on the county's highways are no safer simply because this clerk, who
did not even know of the highway funds, can be convicted of a federal of-
fense. This scenario is not designed to demonstrate that section 666 is un-
necessary, rather, it proves that section 666 must be more narrowly drafted
to achieve Congress' desired result.
In addition, the above scenario reflects a situation in which the Federal
Government could be forced to prosecute a criminal matter more appropri-
protect the "vast sums" of monies the Federal Government distributed to various state, local,
or private entities.
248. Wartzman, Nature or Nurture? Study Blames Ethical Lapses on Corporate Goals,
Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1987, at 27, col. 3.
249. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 4, at 369-70, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &




ately reserved to a particular county or state government. Such federal in-
tervention into matters properly handled on a local level runs counter to two
other congressional expectations under section 666: First, because the new
statute applies in a nonfederal arena, local officials would accept a greater
prosecutorial burden in theft and bribery prosecutions;251 and second, the
statute only pertains to substantial criminal acts.25 2 Although strict judicial
interpretation and construction of section 666 can eliminate the problems
this hypothetical exposes, such judicial action does not guarantee uniform
results or enforcement. Rather, judicial interpretation of section 666 would
be more consistent, intellectually honest, and judicially efficient if Congress
confined the scope of section 666 to its specific purpose.
In applying this statute, courts should remember that beneath the words is
a purpose, and that purpose, although directed at nonfederal individuals and
entities, is still distinctly federal. As previously stated, Congress' objective in
enacting section 666 was to protect federal funds, disbursed under a federal
program. Section 666 was the beast created to effectuate this congressional
goal, but the beast cannot effectively stalk its prey if the jurisdictional forest
is too vast.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal programs and federal grants play an integral role in the function-
ing of state and local governments and private organizations. The incidence
of theft and bribery in these programs necessitated congressional enactment
of a criminal statute tailored to the unique methods by which federal pro-
grams operate and disburse federal funds. The case law dealing with sec-
tions 201 and 641 of title 18 highlight the inadequacies of those provisions in
controlling bribery and theft in federal programs. As this Note demon-
strates, section 666 of title 18 gives the Federal Government greater ability
to safeguard its interests in the disbursement of federal funds. Section 666
affords this protection by providing for federal prosecution of theft and brib-
ery occurring in nonfederal entities receiving federal funds. Yet, as also dis-
cussed, section 666's seemingly limitless scope can result in misapplication
thereby undermining its effectiveness.
Because the focus of section 666 is on the relationship between the Federal
Government and the entity benefiting from federal monies, the statute does
not require that either the stolen property or the bribe have any direct link to
the federal program. Based upon the statutory language of section 666, any
employee of an entity receiving federal benefits exceeding $10,000 in a single
251. Id.
252. Id. at 3511.
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year, who commits theft or accepts a bribe, is subject to federal prosecution,
regardless of whether the employee personally administers the funds, or in
any way participates in or knows of the federal program or its benefits. If
this is indeed the scope of the new statute, it is not reflected in the legislative
history. Furthermore, with such a result, the possibility of federal ingress
into the activities of employees of state, local, and private entities becomes
virtually boundless.
Section 666 of title 18 is a valuable statute - a statute necessary to protect
federal interests in the state and private sector. However, the courts should
not forget that Congress enacted the statute for a specific purpose, the pre-
vention of corruption in federally funded programs by nonfederal employees.
This goal will be undermined if the statute is subject to indiscriminate use by
overzealous prosecutors seeking to impose federal jurisdiction where none
exists. To prevent this misuse, Congress must define more precisely the ac-
tivities subject to prosecution under section 666, thereby narrowing the stat-
ute's scope. However, until such a redrafting occurs, the federal courts must
recognize their responsibility in ensuring that the application of section 666
conforms with its congressional purpose.
Daniel N. Rosenstein
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